![]() I therefore call for an improvement of Greene's argument. A rival sentimentalist view, according to which all moral judgments are determined by emotion, is at least as plausible given the empirical evidence and independently supported by philosophical theory. ![]() Moreover, it is implausible that such emotions produce specifically deontological judgments. In particular, it is not clear that Greene's characterization of alarm-like emotions that are relative to culture and personal experience is empirically tenable. Greene's empirical evidence is open to alternative interpretations. It argues that Greene's argument against deontology needs further support. This paper is a defense of deontological ethical theory. Accordingly Greene maintains that deontology should be abandoned. ago Yes, I myself have only read a handful of YA books and personally, it is not my cup of tea but I know people who read YA books well into their age and are made fun of. Deontological ethics is a mere rationalization of these emotions. ago Anything that gets 'young adults' to READ is awesome in my opinion. At the heart of Greene's argument against deontology is the claim that deontological moral judgments are the product of certain emotions and not of reason. Kantian ethics, and deontological ethics more generally, is a rival view that Greene attacks. For instance, in his recent book, Greene (2013) relies on empirical findings to establish utilitarianism as a superior normative ethical theory. In addition, the account fuels interesting speculations about common metaethical intuitions.Įmpirical research into moral decision-making is often taken to have normative implications. Our account sheds light on why moral intuitions are so frequently experienced and why they are so compelling and resistant to argument. It thus facilitates optimal decision-making, preventing excessive interference by rational deliberation. The FORs renders evaluations resulting from rational deliberation less compelling than the evaluations produced by simple evolved systems. This system is triggered when we experience conflicting evaluations. We illustrate the phenomenology of the FOR with examples of non-moral and moral cases and provide a biological and mechanistic account: the emergence of human reasoning capacities created a need for the co-evolution of a psychological system producing the feeling of rightness (the FORs). Moral intuitions are composed of two elements: an evaluative mental state and a feeling of rightness (FOR). Our proposal is a novel in-depth analysis of moral intuitions which captures their phenomenological, mechanistic and evolutionary features. We first survey standard accounts of moral intuition, pointing out their interesting and problematic aspects. This article describes a fourth approach, communicative ethics, which has the potential to integrate the previous methods. Apologize For Delayed Response (Email Sample)Despite the wide use of the notion of moral intuition, its psychological features remain a matter of debate and it is unclear why humans evolved the capacity to experience it. ![]()
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